There's little doubt that EMV has better security than simple mag stripe cards. EMV cards currently can't be skimmed or duplicated, unlike mag stripe cards. That gets rid of a bunch of fraud channels.
The EMV standard is large and there are many ways to implement it. There are currently(?) 3 types of chips - SDA, DDA and CDA, with each chip improving security. With such a large standard, and so many ways to implement it, there are bound to be insecure combinations. It's far from perfect.
Allowing the Chip to authenticate the PIN (Offline PIN) is not mandatory. In Australia for example, I believe it's uncommon as EFT terminals are always online - in Europe I understand it's more common to have terminals which are offline. So I believe the attack linked from ZDNet wouldn't work in Australia. Which isn't to say there aren't others - see here for another great attack: http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2010/02/man-in-the-midd_1.html
EMV will be the future in most countries, with the US being the exception (It's the only exception I know of, but I'm no expert) where EMV has yet to take hold, partly, I hear, due to the cost of rolling out such a large number of new terminals. In Australia at least, MasterCard and VISA tune the liabilities to favour companies which adopt the new standards. This has the effect of encouraging take up of EMV and other schemes like 3D-Secure.