Skip to main content

You are confoundingconflating two different types of risk here.

First, you want to invest money, and presumably you're not looking at the "lowest risk, lowest returns" end of the spectrum. This is an inherently risky activity.

Second, you are in a principal-agent relationship with your advisor, and are exposed to the risk of your advisor not maximizing your profits. A lot has been written on principal-agent theory, and while incentive schemes exist, there is no optimal solution.

In your case, you hope that your agent will start maximizing your profits if they are 100% correlated with his profits. While this idea is true (at least according to standard economic theory, you could find exceptions in behavioral economics and in reality), it also forces the agent to participate in the first risk.

From the point of view of the agent, this does not make sense. He is looking to render services and receive income for it. An agent with integrity is certainly prepared to carry the risk of his own incompetence, just like Apple is prepared to replace your iPhone should it not start one day. But the agent is not prepared to carry additional risks such as the market risk, and should not be compelled to do so. It is your risk, a risk you personally take by deciding to play the investment gamble, and you cannot transfer it to somebody else.

Of course, what makes the situation here more difficult than the iPhone example is that market-driven losses cannot be easily distinguished from incompetent-agent losses. So, there is no setup in which you carry the market risk only and your agent carries the incompetence risk only. But as much as you want a solution in which the agent carries all risk, you probably won't find an agent willing to sign such a contract. So you have to simply accept that both the market risk and the incompetence risk are inherent to being an investor.

You can try to mitigate your own incompetence by having an advisor invest for you, but then you have to accept the risk of his incompetence. There is no way to depress the total incompetence risk to zero.

You are confounding two different types of risk here.

First, you want to invest money, and presumably you're not looking at the "lowest risk, lowest returns" end of the spectrum. This is an inherently risky activity.

Second, you are in a principal-agent relationship with your advisor, and are exposed to the risk of your advisor not maximizing your profits. A lot has been written on principal-agent theory, and while incentive schemes exist, there is no optimal solution.

In your case, you hope that your agent will start maximizing your profits if they are 100% correlated with his profits. While this idea is true (at least according to standard economic theory, you could find exceptions in behavioral economics and in reality), it also forces the agent to participate in the first risk.

From the point of view of the agent, this does not make sense. He is looking to render services and receive income for it. An agent with integrity is certainly prepared to carry the risk of his own incompetence, just like Apple is prepared to replace your iPhone should it not start one day. But the agent is not prepared to carry additional risks such as the market risk, and should not be compelled to do so. It is your risk, a risk you personally take by deciding to play the investment gamble, and you cannot transfer it to somebody else.

Of course, what makes the situation here more difficult than the iPhone example is that market-driven losses cannot be easily distinguished from incompetent-agent losses. So, there is no setup in which you carry the market risk only and your agent carries the incompetence risk only. But as much as you want a solution in which the agent carries all risk, you probably won't find an agent willing to sign such a contract. So you have to simply accept that both the market risk and the incompetence risk are inherent to being an investor.

You can try to mitigate your own incompetence by having an advisor invest for you, but then you have to accept the risk of his incompetence. There is no way to depress the total incompetence risk to zero.

You are conflating two different types of risk here.

First, you want to invest money, and presumably you're not looking at the "lowest risk, lowest returns" end of the spectrum. This is an inherently risky activity.

Second, you are in a principal-agent relationship with your advisor, and are exposed to the risk of your advisor not maximizing your profits. A lot has been written on principal-agent theory, and while incentive schemes exist, there is no optimal solution.

In your case, you hope that your agent will start maximizing your profits if they are 100% correlated with his profits. While this idea is true (at least according to standard economic theory, you could find exceptions in behavioral economics and in reality), it also forces the agent to participate in the first risk.

From the point of view of the agent, this does not make sense. He is looking to render services and receive income for it. An agent with integrity is certainly prepared to carry the risk of his own incompetence, just like Apple is prepared to replace your iPhone should it not start one day. But the agent is not prepared to carry additional risks such as the market risk, and should not be compelled to do so. It is your risk, a risk you personally take by deciding to play the investment gamble, and you cannot transfer it to somebody else.

Of course, what makes the situation here more difficult than the iPhone example is that market-driven losses cannot be easily distinguished from incompetent-agent losses. So, there is no setup in which you carry the market risk only and your agent carries the incompetence risk only. But as much as you want a solution in which the agent carries all risk, you probably won't find an agent willing to sign such a contract. So you have to simply accept that both the market risk and the incompetence risk are inherent to being an investor.

You can try to mitigate your own incompetence by having an advisor invest for you, but then you have to accept the risk of his incompetence. There is no way to depress the total incompetence risk to zero.

Source Link
rumtscho
  • 550
  • 4
  • 12

You are confounding two different types of risk here.

First, you want to invest money, and presumably you're not looking at the "lowest risk, lowest returns" end of the spectrum. This is an inherently risky activity.

Second, you are in a principal-agent relationship with your advisor, and are exposed to the risk of your advisor not maximizing your profits. A lot has been written on principal-agent theory, and while incentive schemes exist, there is no optimal solution.

In your case, you hope that your agent will start maximizing your profits if they are 100% correlated with his profits. While this idea is true (at least according to standard economic theory, you could find exceptions in behavioral economics and in reality), it also forces the agent to participate in the first risk.

From the point of view of the agent, this does not make sense. He is looking to render services and receive income for it. An agent with integrity is certainly prepared to carry the risk of his own incompetence, just like Apple is prepared to replace your iPhone should it not start one day. But the agent is not prepared to carry additional risks such as the market risk, and should not be compelled to do so. It is your risk, a risk you personally take by deciding to play the investment gamble, and you cannot transfer it to somebody else.

Of course, what makes the situation here more difficult than the iPhone example is that market-driven losses cannot be easily distinguished from incompetent-agent losses. So, there is no setup in which you carry the market risk only and your agent carries the incompetence risk only. But as much as you want a solution in which the agent carries all risk, you probably won't find an agent willing to sign such a contract. So you have to simply accept that both the market risk and the incompetence risk are inherent to being an investor.

You can try to mitigate your own incompetence by having an advisor invest for you, but then you have to accept the risk of his incompetence. There is no way to depress the total incompetence risk to zero.